Subject: A5-0257/2004
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7 April 2004

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FINAL

A5-0257/2004

REPORT

on improving safety at
sea
(2003/2235(INI))

Temporary Committee on improving safety at
sea

Rapporteur: Dirk Sterckx

PR_INI

339.038

CONTENTS

PROCEDURAL PAGE

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

PROCEDURAL PAGE

At the sitting of 6 November 2003 the European
Parliament, pursuant to Rule 150(2) of the Rules of Procedure,
adopted a decision on setting up a temporary committee on improving
safety at sea.

To comply with its brief, the temporary committee
appointed Dirk Sterckx rapporteur at its meeting of 26 November
2003.

It considered the draft report at its meetings of 8
March 2004 and 5 April 2004.

At the latter meeting it adopted the draft resolution
by 25 votes to 1, with 16 abstentions.

The following were present for the vote: Georg
Jarzembowski (chairman), Rosa Miguélez Ramos, Wilhelm Ernst Piecyk
(vice-chairmen), Dirk Sterckx (rapporteur), Sylviane H. Ainardi,
María Antonia Avilés (for Philip Charles Bradbourn), María del Pilar
Ayuso González (for Salvador Garriga Polledo pursuant to Rule
153(2)), Juan José Bayona de Perogordo (for Françoise Grossetête
pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Raquel Cardoso, Ilda Figueiredo (for
Emmanouil Bakopoulos), Jacqueline Foster, Cristina García-Orcoyen
Tormo, Koldo Gorostiaga Atxalandabaso, María Esther Herranz García
(for Konstantinos Hatzidakis pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Liam Hyland
(for Niall Andrews pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Juan de Dios Izquierdo
Collado, Hans Karlsson, Brigitte Langenhagen, Emmanouil Mastorakis,
Manuel Medina Ortega (for Karin Scheele pursuant to Rule 153(2)),
Iñigo Méndez de Vigo (for Ari Vatanen pursuant to Rule 153(2)),
Bill Miller (for Giovanni Claudio Fava), Ana Miranda de Lage (for
Marie-Hélène Gillig), Enrique Monsonís Domingo, Francesco Musotto,
Riitta Myller, Camilo Nogueira Román, Gérard Onesta (for Marie Anne
Isler Béguin), Marcelino Oreja Arburúa (for Giles Bryan Chichester),
Josu Ortuondo Larrea, Manuel Pérez Álvarez, Bernard Poignant,
Christian Foldberg Rovsing, José Ignacio Salafranca Sánchez-Neyra
(for Hugues Martin pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Gilles Savary, Olle
Schmidt (for Astrid Thors pursuant to Rule 153(2)), Brian Simpson,
Dominique F.C. Souchet, Daniel Varela Suanzes-Carpegna, Herman
Vermeer, Alejo Vidal-Quadras Roca (for Peter Pex pursuant to Rule
153(2)) and Jan Marinus Wiersma.

The report was tabled on 7 April 2004.

MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
RESOLUTION

on improving safety at sea

2003/2235(INI))

The European Parliament,

–   having regard to Article 31 of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which states:
'Every worker has the right to working conditions which respect his
or her health, safety and dignity',

–   having regard to its decision of 6
November 2003 to set up a temporary committee on improving safety at
sea(1),

–   having regard to its resolutions of
21 November 2002, 19 December 2002 and 23 September 2003 concerning
the Prestige disaster(2) and its previous resolutions on safety
at sea,

–   having regard to the public
hearings of the Temporary Committee on improving safety at sea held
on 1-2 December 2003 and 22 January and 18 February 2004,

–   having regard to the submissions in
writing by the speakers invited to the public hearings,

–   having regard to its resolution of
12 February 2004 on the fate of the Greek and Filipino members of
the crew of the Tasman Spirit in Karachi, Pakistan(3),

–   having regard to the exchange of
views between a delegation from the Temporary Committee on improving
safety at sea and the master of the Prestige on 5 February 2004 in
Barcelona,

–   having regard to the decisions
adopted by the IMO at the 23rd session of its Assembly in
November-December 2003,

–   having regard to Rule 150(2) of its
Rules of Procedure,

–   having regard to the report of the
Temporary Committee on improving safety at sea (A5-0257/2004),

A.   whereas various incidents in
European waters have caused pollution since the Erika and Prestige
disasters, such as that involving the Andinet, which lost leaky
drums containing toxic substances off the coast of the
Netherlands,

B.   whereas research shows that, more
than ten years after the Exxon Valdez oil disaster, the impact on
the environment and the ecosystem is still visible and that
short-term solutions such as clean-up operations can in the long
term make matters even worse, although account must be taken of the
particular characteristics of the oil carried by the Exxon Valdez
and the fuel-oil carried by the Prestige, as well as the vast
differences, in terms of coastline, climate and movement of waters,
between Alaska and Galicia,

C.   whereas major accidents are not
the only problem: worldwide much of the pollution with hydrocarbons
caused by ships is due to deliberate discharges, such as degassing;
whereas, therefore, it is necessary to combat these illegal
discharges by introducing a system of appropriate penalties,

D.   whereas some maritime transport
operators have made efforts to modernise their fleets and to train
the seafarers they employ but further initiatives, including
Community initiatives, are still needed,

E.   whereas the Commission has
promised to put forward in 2004 a new package of measures to improve
safety at sea, comprising proposals concerning the living and
working conditions of seafarers; port state and flag state control;
maritime transport management and information; passenger liability
and investigations into maritime accidents,

F.   whereas the master of the
Prestige, after having been detained for 83 days and having paid
security of $ 3.2 m, is still required to report daily to the
Spanish police,

G.   whereas such treatment has
subsequently been repeated in the ongoing case of the Tasman
Spirit,

H.   having regard to the rejection by
the court in Corcubión of the European Parliament's request to hear
the master during a public hearing in Brussels,

I.   whereas, nearly a year and a half
after the disaster, still no dates have been set for the opening of
the proceedings against the master,

J.   having regard to the statements by
the master of the Prestige to Parliament concerning (a) the poor
accessibility of the emergency towing installation because of the
prevailing conditions, particularly the weather, (b) the damage to
the engine as a result of which it could not immediately be started,
(c) the requests by both the master and the rescuers to take the
vessel to a place of refuge,

K.   whereas the exact quantities are
unclear but before the disaster there was 77 000 tons of heavy oil
on board the Prestige, it is estimated that 14 000 tons now remain
there, some 43 000 tons, according to the Spanish authorities'
statistics, having been washed up and/or cleaned up; whereas
therefore approximately 20 000 tons are unaccounted for, which
consequently could still be a threat to the environment and the
coast,

L.   whereas the master of the Prestige
estimated that 2000-3000 tons of fuel was lost immediately after the
initial damage to the Prestige, as opposed to the Spanish
authorities who estimated that at that time approximately 10 000
tons was lost,

The Prestige disaster and the wreck

1.   Deplores the various shipping
accidents which have occurred since the sinking of the Prestige,
particularly the disaster involving the freighter Rocknes off the
coast of Norway, which caused 18 deaths in January 2004; calls on
the authorities to investigate the causes and the circumstances,
particularly what role possibly the lack of communication skills and
the fact that this vessel was double-hulled played in the
disaster;

2.   Stresses that far more attention
ought to be devoted to the maintenance and condition of vessels, as
a poorly maintained double-hulled tanker represents a greater
potential hazard than a well-maintained single-hulled tanker;

3.   Expresses its concern about the
statement by the government commissioner on behalf of the Spanish
authorities that if a disaster identical to the Prestige disaster
were to recur, a decision would again be taken to tow the vessel
away from the coast;

4.   Welcomes the sealing operation to
stop oil leaking from the wreck of the Prestige and the specific
plans for making the wreck safe; calls on the competent authorities
to continue their efforts to tackle the problem of the oil still
present in the sea and the thousands of tons of waste in landfills
and to put forward a detailed calendar for the extraction and
treatment of the waste; urges that the expertise gained in the
process be disseminated and used in tackling any future
accidents;

5.   Notes with concern that, nearly a
year and a half after the Prestige disaster, all the investigations
into the causes and circumstances of the disaster have still not
been completed or the findings published; notes that the findings of
the investigation by the Prestige's flag state (the Bahamas), for
example, are still awaited; urges that agreements be reached under
the auspices of the IMO on the speedy and independent investigation
of shipping disasters and that the IMO include this requirement in
its audit scheme for maritime authorities;

6.   Calls on the Spanish judicial
authorities, on the basis of total respect for the full independence
of their decision-making and of Article 73 of the Montego Bay
Convention, to allow the master of the Prestige to return to his
country pending his trial, and to relax the requirement for him to
report daily, and as soon as possible to clarify the date on which
the legal proceedings against the master are to begin, and the
schedule for these proceedings;

Improving maritime safety at European
level

7.   Stresses that, in response to the
Erika and Prestige disasters, important legislative measures have
been taken to make shipping safer in European waters and that rapid
and complete introduction and strict enforcement of the European
rules by the Member States must therefore be a priority; deplores
the fact, in this connection, that seven Member States (Italy,
Austria, Luxembourg, Greece, Finland, Belgium and the Netherlands)
have still not transposed, or have still not completely transposed,
two crucial directives on port state control and classification
societies;

8.   Considers that, as it is also very
important to have effective emergency planning on board vessels, the
Commission should propose measures to ensure that all tankers and
vessels carrying a significant quantity of oil as fuel should be
required to maintain a comprehensive vessel emergency response plan
as part of an EU-wide industry-based Emergency Response System;

9.   Deplores likewise that some Member
States have not fully implemented the directive establishing a
Community vessel traffic monitoring and information system and
particularly Article 20 thereof, which concerns the drawing-up of
plans to provide places of refuge for ships in distress(4);

10.   Calls on each coastal Member
State to establish a clear decision-making and command structure for
dealing with maritime emergencies and an independent authority which
has the powers and expertise to take the necessary decisions, with
which all parties concerned must comply, in particular the selection
and mandatory assignment of an emergency mooring or port;

11.   Emphasises the importance of
transnational cooperation in dealing with major maritime accidents,
based on standing operational networks and clear rules and
procedures tested regularly via exercises;

12.   Stresses that, when considering
measures to improve safety at sea, sufficient attention must be
devoted to particular features of the EU's various sea areas, which
differ, inter alia, on account of climate: for example, special
safety requirements apply in the Baltic during the winter;

13.   Calls for the establishment of a
European coastguard service equipped with the necessary competence
and instruments to ensure: (1) maritime safety and the protection of
the marine environment (including fisheries surveillance),
protection against terrorism, piracy and maritime crime; (2) strict
monitoring of adherence to certain shipping routes and the
prosecution of the illegal entry of vessels; (3) the swiftest
possible coordination of the necessary measures in the event of an
accident at sea, including the assignment of emergency moorings and
ports;

14.   Welcomes the initiative of the
Commission to organise a series of visits to Member States to verify
the existence and contents of plans for dealing with places of
refuge; calls on the Commission to complete as soon as possible its
evaluation of the plans submitted and its visits to appropriate
locations and submit the results of this investigation to the
Council and the European Parliament and to make a clear statement
which parts of the plans should be public;

15.   Is concerned about the increasing
transhipment of oil between vessels off the coasts of Europe;
calls on the Member States therefore, when drawing up emergency
plans, to take account of the specific risks associated with
this;

16.   Observes that the capacity for
cleaning up oil at sea has proved inadequate in certain areas and
that no improvement measures have been taken since the sinking of
the Prestige; welcomes the fact, therefore, that EMSA is being
assigned an operational remit in this field and stresses the
importance of making available the requisite funding to carry out
this remit;

17.   Reiterates its request that the
Commission make proposals as soon as possible for financial
compensation for places of refuge and to make it clear to what
extent existing international conventions already provide for
compensation; calls on the Member States and the Union to ratify
these conventions as soon as possible;

18.   Calls on the Commission to
investigate the scope for introducing mandatory insurance for
vessels in European waters so that damages and costs of places of
refuge as well as social and environmental costs in the event of an
accident can also be recovered from the owners of vessels; calls for
a proposal for the introduction of an EU-wide common method for
disaster assessment, with a view to facilitating, as in the US,
compensation for social or collective damage to the natural
heritage, including the deterioration of commercially non-viable
marine and land biodiversity;

19.   Considers that the insurance
system to be established must cover not only the value of the cargo
but also risks of potential environmental damage in the light of the
nature of the cargo;

20.   Calls on the Transport Council,
one year after the publication of the Commission proposal, to
finally adopt a position on the directive concerning the
introduction of penalties (under the criminal law) for pollution
from ships; stresses its view that a system of penalties is crucial
in order to combat illegal discharges, but that this must not result
in a general criminalisation of seafarers, thereby damaging the
image of their profession;

21.   Views with concern the limited
progress made by certain new Member States in implementing European
and world rules on maritime safety; notes that there is particular
concern about the new Member States: the Baltic States, Malta and
Cyprus; calls on the Commission to continue to monitor closely the
process of integration of the acquis and calls on the new Member
States, in particular Malta and Cyprus, to continue their efforts
and strengthen their maritime administrations;

22.   Welcomes the periodic publication
by the Commission of a black list of vessels which are banned from
entering European waters and ports; urges the Member States to
enforce strictly the provisions of the port State control Directive
on refusal of access and to improve, standardise and step up port
inspections, while urging the Commission to carry out effective
controls and to undertake an audit of the classification societies,
including their subsidiaries and companies part-owned by them,
introducing penalties for non-compliance with obligations;

23.   Calls on the Commission to
promote a detailed study of all chemical products and radioactive
substances carried by vessels, providing specific information on
degree of toxicity, chemical composition and dangerousness;

24.   Calls on the Commission to make a
proposal for tracing (by means of transponders) containers and other
loading units containing dangerous goods, so that they can be
located after being lost at sea; calls on the Commission to further
develop the SafeSeaNet European data exchange platform in order to
add new functionalities and integrate new technological
developments, such as transponders; urges the Member States to fully
use this system with a view to closer monitoring of traffic and
better identification of ships likely to pose a risk to safety,
security or the environment;

25.   Is concerned about the
registration and labelling of containers and drums containing
hazardous chemicals and substances, in view of the loss of a highly
toxic cargo from the Andinet in the North Sea, when it became
apparent that the substance in question was not the same as that
indicated in the bills of lading;

26.   Is concerned that the partnership
and cooperation agreement (PCA) recently concluded between Russia
and the European Community provides insufficient safeguards for
maritime safety in the Baltic region; calls on the Commission,
therefore, to coordinate closely with Member States and the European
Parliament its continuing negotiations with Russia, with a view to
developing common criteria to determine conditions of access to the
Baltic for ships carrying dangerous cargo; considers that the
outcome of these negotiations should reflect an equal level of
responsibility for both signatories to protect the marine
environment of the Baltic region;

27.   Urges the Commission, in the
promised proposal for a directive on investigating shipping
accidents, to provide for a system which will ensure optimal
exchanges of findings from investigations between Member States, the
Commission and EMSA and safeguard the independence of
investigations, preferably by setting up an independent European
investigation unit within EMSA;

28.   Calls on the Commission to
examine the possibility of giving EMSA access, under certain
conditions and in particular unannounced, to vessels for the purpose
of performing on the spot inspection and examination tasks assigned
to it and to draft a proposal accordingly, if appropriate;

29.   Calls, in addition, for an
increased budgetary allocation for EMSA, so that it can have at its
service, as soon as possible, a fleet of anti-pollution vessels to
complement the Member States' efforts, and can also perform more
effective checks on the activities of the classification
societies;

30.   Stresses the importance of
providing the most up-to-date navigational means, such as:
Electronic Navigational Charts (ENC), Electronic Chart Display and
Information System (ECDIS) as well as regularly updated information
on water depths (especially in areas with restricted water
depths);

Improving maritime safety worldwide

31.   Supports the call by the
Secretary-General of the IMO for the EU Member States to continue
playing a full part in the work of the IMO and welcomes the outcome
of the discussions between the Commissioner responsible for
transport and the IMO Secretary-General on the margins of the MARE
meeting in January 2004 concerning closer cooperation between their
organisations;

32.   Reiterates its request to the
Council to apply for membership of the IMO for the Union;

33.   Is concerned about the increase
in exports of Russian oil via the Baltic and along the shores of the
EU, as they often make use of the cheapest substandard tonnage;
welcomes, accordingly, close cooperation between the Commission and
the IMO, which must check that classification societies are carrying
out inspections properly and that the certificates issued are
correct;

34.   Understands the concern of the
Secretary-General of the IMO regarding unilateral and regional
action by countries outside the framework of the IMO, considers,
however, that EU action may sometimes be necessary in the interests
of safety; considers, moreover, that EU measures can act as a
catalyst within the IMO, as in the case of the accelerated
phasing-out of single-hulled tankers;

35.   Considers that the designation of
Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA) under the auspices of the
IMO should be accompanied by clear and enforceable rules, such as
more stringent compulsory reporting, identification of all operators
and rerouting of high-risk vessels, differentiated according to
cargo; deplores the action taken by some IMO member states to
postpone any new designation of PSSA areas;

36.   Regrets that up until now only
three IMO member states have ratified the International Convention
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 2001, of which
only one is an EU Member State, as any bunker oil spill is a threat
to the marine environment and its biodiversity, and that without
full ratification there will be no international framework covering
pollution damage resulting from a bunker oil spill; to that effect
urges EU Member States to ratify the convention and the Commission
to promote such ratification;

37.   Calls for the establishment of
special zones within environmentally sensitive and navigationally
difficult areas of the Baltic Sea, particularly the Kadet Trench,
the Skagerrak/Kattegat, the Great Belt and the Sound, which
ocean-going vessels, in particular oil tankers, may no longer
negotiate without a pilot and calls on the Commission and the Member
States to initiate the necessary measures in the competent
international bodies, in particular the IMO;

38.   Welcomes the recommendation on
harmonised rules concerning transport in the Baltic Sea area during
the winter adopted by the Helsinki Commission for the Protection of
the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area (HELCOM);

39.   Rejects, on the other hand, the
categorical banning of high-risk vessels from the 200-mile zone, as
this measure is legally contentious, impedes rapid and effective
assistance to vessels in distress and their crews, and causes
vessels to make detours, which displaces or even aggravates the
problem;

40.   Reiterates the need to revise the
International Law of the Sea so as to confer greater powers on
coastal states to reinforce maritime safety in their exclusive
economic zones and to improve the protection of the marine
environment;

41.   Stresses that up to 80% of
accidents at sea are due to human error, even higher in the case of
collisions and groundings; considers that the human element is
multi-faceted; therefore calls on the Commission to address the
human element issues when adopting a new 'Erika III' package, which
it has announced for 2004, and urges the introduction of compulsory
refresher courses and courses on rescue operations under the terms
of the STCW Convention;

42.   Calls on the Commission and the
Member States to press within the IMO for more stringent
international rules in regard to safety training for captains,
officers and crews, with particular reference to compulsory further
training and refresher courses in vessel safety, accident
management, fire protection, and emergency measures such as towing,
emergency moorings or combating harmful substances;

43.   Believes there should be an
international programme for cooperation bringing together all of the
world's vessel inspection systems (MOUs), including a centralised
and easily accessible database that can be consulted rapidly, with a
view to ensuring that the movement of vessels between zones does not
permit the loss of traces or the disappearance of any record of
offences;

44.   Welcomes in this context the
inspections which EMSA will perform regarding the application of the
STCW Convention in third countries; stresses that penalties are
needed in cases of flagrant violation of the Convention, and calls
on the Commission in particular to take strong action against
countries which issue certificates of competency for merchant
shipping officers on false or fraudulent grounds;

45.   Calls for measures to raise the
prestige of maritime occupations and make them more attractive to
young people in general and young Europeans in particular;

46.   Expresses its concern about the
proliferation of counterfeit and fraudulent certificates; requests
the Commission to establish incentives for crew members to inform
authorities where these criminal activities are prevalent and no
corrective action is taken by the owners or flag state;

47.   Welcomes the decisions adopted by
the IMO in December 2003 concerning guidelines for ports of refuge
and the introduction of a voluntary audit system for IMO member
states; urges, however, that this system be made compulsory without
delay and its results published;

48.   Is aware of the difficulty faced
by certain third states in implementing international rules on
safety at sea; calls therefore on the Council and Commission to
incorporate in the Community's development policy programmes to
bolster maritime administrations;

49.   Calls for a review of the
international legislation on maritime transport with a view to
improving transparency as regards operational structures, identity
of the operators, type of goods carried and the safety measures
applying in each case; reiterates the need for measures to encourage
vessels to fly Community flags rather than flags of convenience of
countries which do not meet the vessel inspection and safety
standards;

Socioeconomic, environmental and fisheries
aspects

50.   Notes that the rapid opening-up
of fishing grounds in the affected areas after the Prestige disaster
may in the short term have eased the situation of the fishing
industry concerned, but fears that, in the longer term, this
decision in combination with overfishing will adversely affect fish
stocks and the profitability of the industry;

51.   Stresses that, one year and more
on from the Prestige disaster and despite the reduction in
extractive activity, information from the local fishermen's
associations suggests that there has been a considerable shortfall
vis-à-vis usual catch levels in respect of fish stocks in the
area;

52.   Stresses that under the new
Community financial perspective (2007-2013) provision must be made
for specific financial instruments for the fisheries sector of a
nature suited to the needs of coastal communities affected by
maritime disasters;

53.   Stresses that experience of the
Exxon Valdez disaster demonstrates the need for long-term scientific
research into the environmental impact of the Prestige disaster;
considers that this research should examine, inter alia, the
knock-on effects of pollution in the food chain and the impact of
the pollution on biodiversity; urges that agreements be reached on
the joint financing of such research by the regions and Member
States concerned and by the EU;

54.   Considers that the effective role
played by fishing fleets in combating pollution from the Prestige
and in perfecting fuel recovery trawls should encourage EU Member
States to develop preventively, on a permanent basis, with the aid
of Community funding, this flexible approach to cleaning up
pollution, which makes it possible to act before pollution reaches
the coast;

55.   Hopes that such long-term
research and exchanges of the research findings will make it
possible to assess more realistically the immediate and delayed
damage and thus arrive at a more considered approach to future
environmental disasters;

56.   Considers that the Commission
should ensure that response to wildlife during an oil spill is
integrated into the overall oil spill response and planning
mechanisms, ensuring that this response is carried out according to
best practice; considers furthermore that the Commission should
prioritise the development of adequate measures to restore damaged
ecosystems following an oil spill and ensure the recovery of
populations of affected species;

57.   Instructs its President to
forward this resolution to the Council and Commission.

EXPLANATORY STATEMENT

On 19 November 2002, the oil tanker Prestige sank off
the coast of Galicia, Spain, after having drifted around for six
days in atrocious weather conditions. This caused an ecological and
economic disaster of unusual proportions. The fishing industry and
tourism in Galicia and neighbouring regions were particularly hard
hit. The oil spread over a large area and caused pollution not only
on the coast of Spain but also, inter alia, on that of France and
Portugal.

Immediately after the sinking of the Prestige, the
European Parliament adopted two resolutions expressing its concern
about the ecological disaster which was developing. On 19 and 20
March 2003, Parliament held a public hearing with various experts in
Brussels. In March 2003 a delegation from Parliament visited the
affected area in Galicia, and this was followed by a visit to
various maritime organisations and institutes in Brest, France, in
April 2003. The findings were recorded in a report and a resolution
adopted by the European Parliament on 23 September 2003.

Temporary Committee on improving safety at
sea

In its resolution of 23 September, Parliament called,
inter alia, for the setting-up of a temporary parliamentary
committee on improving safety at sea. It was to build on earlier
work by Parliament. On 5 November 2003, the setting-up of the
committee (the 'MARE committee') was formally approved in plenary,
its powers being as follows:

(a)   to examine in detail maritime
disasters, in particular the Prestige, the Erika and other recent
accidents and incidents;

(b)   to further analyse their social
and economic consequences, with regard in particular to fisheries,
industry and tourism, as well as the environment and health;

(c)   to assess maritime safety
standards more generally and the application of these standards by
the Member States in compliance with EU and international law;

(d)   to seek to ensure implementation
of the recommendations contained in its resolution of 23 September
2003;

(e)   to propose additional measures
which were found to be necessary.

After a constituent meeting in November, the Temporary
Committee on improving safety at sea held three public hearings (in
December, January and February) at which it heard numerous technical
experts, scientists and representatives of non-governmental
organisations concerning the subjects mentioned in the committee's
remit. At the same time, discussions were held with government
representatives; discussion partners included the European
Commission, the Irish Presidency of the Council and the Spanish
government commissioner responsible for dealing with the
Prestige.

Exchange of views with the master of the Prestige,
Apostoulos Mangouras

In January, the chairman of the Temporary Committee
asked the Spanish judicial authorities to allow the master of the
Prestige, Mr Apostoulos Mangouras, to travel to Brussels to speak at
one of the public hearings there. However, no reply was received
from the court. Thereupon a delegation from the MARE committee,
consisting of the chairman, the vice-chairman, the rapporteur and
three members, visited Barcelona on 4 and 5 February to hold
discussions with the master and his lawyer. A few days later, on 10
February, the EP received from the court a rejection of its
request.

During the meeting in Barcelona, which at the master's
request took place in camera, Captain Mangouras presented his
interpretation of the events between 13 November 2002, when the
Prestige found itself in distress, and 15 November 2002, when he was
taken off the vessel by helicopter. The discussion with the
delegation broadly confirmed what the master had told Parliament in
writing in March 2003. The agreement enabled the master to provide
additional information and clarifications where necessary.

For example, he discussed the problems he had
experienced in fixing a life line to the vessel. According to the
master, this was hampered by the weather conditions, oil and water
on the deck and the waves breaking over the deck. Moreover, the
requisite power and crew to operate the emergency towing
installation were lacking.

The master stressed that, both before and after
filling the ballast tanks in order to correct the vessel's list, he
had calculations performed to estimate the risks involved.

The master also gave details of the orders he had
received from the Spanish authorities, the rescue operation and the
legal proceedings which were being prepared against him, in which
the charge would be disobeying orders and pollution of the
environment. The master resolutely denied his guilt.

Lastly, the master observed that the environmental
disaster could have been avoided if the Prestige had been towed to a
port of refuge.

Accidents since the Prestige disaster

Regrettably, despite the measures taken in response to
the sinking of the Prestige, various accidents to ships have
occurred in European waters since November 2002.

One of the most serious was the sinking of the
freighter Rocknes on 19 January 2004. The vessel, with 30 crew on
board, carrying a cargo of stone, is thought to have hit a rock off
the coast of Norway near Bergen, and capsized a few seconds later.
The rescue operation was set in motion swiftly; 12 members of the
crew were rescued, some of them after a hole had been drilled in the
hull. However, the other 18 people on board died in the icy
water.

The rock is not marked on charts and lies outside the
shipping channel. Probably, therefore, the vessel was off course
when it struck the rock. Further investigation will be needed to
establish the exact cause of this disaster. As part of that, it will
be important to establish what role the ship's double hull played in
its sinking; onlookers apparently saw water between the hulls, which
could have explained its rapid capsizing.

In other accidents there were no fatalities but
cargoes - in some cases toxic - escaped into the sea. This was the
case, for example, with the distressed Ethiopian freighter Andinet,
from which three containers and 63 drums containing the wood
preservative arsenic pentoxide were washed overboard off the Dutch
coast in December 2003. It is possible that 5000 litres of this
toxic substance escaped into the water.

Remarks by the rapporteur

Your rapporteur observes that the setting-up of the
MARE committee made it possible for the European Parliament to build
further on the work already done in preparation for the first
Prestige report. At the three public hearings and during the
interview with the master of the Prestige, useful additional
information was presented concerning both the Prestige disaster (and
its handling) and the scope for improving safety at sea in Europe
and worldwide.

For half a year, the MARE committee also provided a
framework in which policy-makers from, inter alia, the EP, Council,
Commission, EMSA and IMO could exchange views on ways of improving
safety at sea. This guaranteed constant political attention for
maritime safety. Sometimes it also yielded direct results. For
example, Commissioner De Palacio and IMO Secretary-General
Mitropoulos took the opportunity provided by their attendance at one
of the public hearings to reach practical agreement, in the margins
of the meeting, on further cooperation between their organisations.
The MARE committee accordingly proved its usefulness as an
international forum.

The MARE committee and this report also provided an
opportunity to evaluate the extent to which the recommendations made
in the Prestige report of September 2003 had already been translated
into policy. In a number of cases the conclusions were positive:
measures have been taken, for instance, to ban old single-hulled
tankers carrying heavy oil from European waters and a good deal of
progress has been made with the conferral of additional powers on
EMSA.

Moreover, the Commission has announced that during
2004 it will submit a package of supplementary measures which will
fulfil a number of the EP's previous requests. The package will
consist of the following proposals:

-   communication on the implementation
of the ILO provisions on the living and working conditions of
seafarers;

-   update of the Port State Control
directive;

-   directive on maritime transport
management and information system (update of Directive
2002/59/EC);

-   regulation on compliance with IMO
flag state rules (combined with simplified PSC procedures);

-   regulation on the application of
the Athens protocol - passengers' liability for all traffic
(national and international) and

-   directive on maritime accident
investigation.

However, the European Parliament's recommendations
have not yet been acted upon in all respects. For example, some
Member States have not yet complied with their legal obligation to
designate ports of refuge and draw up emergency plans; this was one
of the most important points in the resolution of September 2003.
The Council has also made little or no progress with other elements,
such as membership of the IMO for the Union and penalties for
polluting the sea.

In the motion for a resolution, your rapporteur
therefore reiterates various requests which have been made
previously, as well as making a number of new
recommendations.

(1)

P5_TA(2003)0483.

(2)

P5_TA(2002)0575; P5_TA(2002)0629; P5_TA(2003)0400.

(3)

P5_TA(2004)0102.

(4)

OJ L 208, 5.8.2002, p. 10.

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